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Master of the Rolls. Butterworths, 1979. Pp. xxii, 331. Price
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Lord Denning, Master of the Rolls, celebrated his eightieth
birthday in January, 1979. This book is his own contribution to
the event and it is already a best seller. It was sold out shortly after
publication and is now in its third printing.
Lord Denning is one of the best-known figures in English
public life. He has been a judge since 1944 and, apart from five
years in the House of Lords as a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, has
sat in the Court of Appeal since 1948, presiding over it as Master
of the Rolls since 1962. His is a record of judicial service not likely
to be equalled in the future, particularly because judges appointed
after 1959 have to retire at the age of seventy-five. One of his
colleagues, Lord Scarman, has described the past quarter of a century as "the age of legal aid, law reform-and Lord Denning." 1 A
newspaper columnist puts it more emphatically: "Lord Denning is
a man who, unlike the hordes of wretched humbugs who claim to
stand up for the people of England against 'The Establishment,'
actually does so.... [T]his admirable judge is one of the greatest
living Englishmen." 2
His book is about law reform-the necessity of reshaping the
principles laid down in the nineteenth century to meet the needs
of the twentieth. It discusses seven branches of English law with
the development of which Lord Denning has been concerned, in the
form of extensive quotations from his judgments linked by a running commentary. He hopes that his proposals for reform will be
discussed in law schools "and perhaps in future years find acceptance." 8 It is not an easy book to characterize; it is hardly a textbook, but it is much more than an anthology. Probably it is best
f Fellow and Tutor in Law, Brasenose College, Oxford University. LL.B. 1954,
University of Birmingham; M.A. 1960, B.C.L. 1956, Oxford University.
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viewed as an essay in judicial autobiography. It is certainly not the
sort of book that is susceptible of a standard academic review, and
it would be premature to attempt a summing-up of a man who is
reported to admire all the Christian virtues except Resignation.
Lord Denning is most widely known for his decisions on public
law. Three sections of the book are devoted to discussing abuse of
ministerial powers, problems of locus standi, and abuse of "group"
powers. Lord Denning has administered some notable checks to
bureaucracy in his time, and the language of his judgments on
abuse of governmental power is reminiscent of the constitutional
struggles of the seventeenth century. The cases on the abuse of
"group" powers are more controversial because the groups Lord
Denning has in mind are trade unions. An American reader may
be a bit baffled by the intricacies of English trade-union law, but the
political overtones of these cases will be clear. Lord Denning does
not think of himself as being opposed to trade unions, but his individualistic philosophy inevitably brings him into conflict with
a movement based on collective action.
Private law is represented by sections on the rules of construction, the doctrine of promissory estoppel, and liability for negligent
4
statements. Lord Denning's views on construction are unorthodox,
but the other doctrines are among his most successful developments.
The High Trees doctrine 5 (that a representation intended to be
acted on, and in fact acted on, by the representee may raise an
estoppel against the representor) has, in the view of some writers
(including Lord Denning), revolutionized the law of contract. 6
Similarly, his dissenting judgment in Candler v. Crane, Christmas
& Co., 7 vindicated thirteen years later by a unanimous House of
Lords,8 opened up in England the ever-expanding area of liability
for negligent statements. Interestingly enough, Lord Denning is
beginning to have doubts about recent developments in the law of
negligence. After casting a disapproving glance at the growth of
4 They were rejected by the House of Lords in Liverpool City Council v. Irwin,
[1977] A.C. 239.
5 Central London Property Trust, Ltd. v. High Trees House, Ltd., [1947] K.B.
130. "Whenever I speak to students, someone is sure to call out-'High Trees.'
It is greeted with acclaim. This is very different from the reception it used to get
in days past from the higher judiciary."

DENNINTG,

supra note 3, at 199.

6 Atiyah, When Is an Enforceable Agreement Not a Contract? Answer: When
It Is an Equity, 92 LAw Q. Rsv. 174 (1976); Millett, Crabb v. Arun District Council-A Riposte, 92 LAw Q. Ray. 342 (1976). "The effect has been to do away
with the doctrine in all but a handful of cases." DamNNe, supra note 3, at 223.

7 [1951] 2 K.B. 164 (C.A.).
8 Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners, [1964] A.C. 465.
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medical malpractice suits in the United States, he concludes that
the time may have come to call a haltY
The final section of the book is on the doctrine of precedent.
Here, where Lord Denning is concerned, we reach the heart of the
matter. The doctrine of precedent is, of course, applied much more
strictly in England than in the United States, and Lord Denning
has long chafed under the restrictive English rules. His own views
appear in the epigraph he has chosen for his book: "If we never do
anything which has not been done before, we shall never get anywhere." 10 This section tells the story of Lord Denning's unsuccessful battle with the House of Lords for a relaxation of the doctrine. In particular, because the House of Lords is no longer bound
by its own previous decisions, Lord Denning would like a similar
freedom for the Court of Appeal. His most recent attempt to assert
this freedom, in Davis v. Johnson,'. led to what he describes as his
most humiliating defeat. He received a "crushing rebuff" 12 from
the House of Lords, but Lord Denning remains unrepentant, and,
lacking the power to overrule previous decisions of the Court of
Appeal directly, he attempts to justify turning a blind eye to the
authorities as a means of provoking an appeal which may result in
the law being changed. As he points out, this technique has been
successful in some of his most controversial cases; even in Davis v.
Johnson,'13 the House of Lords upheld his interpretation of the
statute in question while condemning his views on precedent.
The technicalities of precedent are, however, only one aspect
of the differences between Lord Denning and the House of Lords,
and not really the most important one. Behind the dispute over
the powers of the Court of Appeal there is a much more fundamental disagreement as to the extent to which law reform is a
matter for the courts at all. While English courts have moved a
long way in the last thirty years towards accepting openly the influence of policy considerations on their decisions, 14 there are still
limits on the kinds of law reform which it is thought proper for the
courts to undertake. Lord Denning's critics believe that he oversteps these limits.
9 "Enough has been done for the sufferer. Now remember the man who has
to foot the bill...." DEnuNI,
supra note 3, at 281.
10 Packer v. Packer, [1954] P. 15, 22 (C.A.) (Denning, L.J.).
11 [1979] A.C. 264 (C.A. & H.L.).
12

NwG, supra note 3, at 299.
[1979] A.C. 264 (C.A. & H.L.).
14 See, e.g., Dorset Yacht Co. v. Home Office, [1970] A.C. 1004.
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It is rather a pity that Lord Denning does not discuss Launchbury v. Morgans,15 because that was a particularly illuminating
example of where the line is drawn. The case concerned a highway
accident involving a driver who was neither the owner of the car
nor employed by her, and the question was whether the owner was
liable for the driver's negligence. English law has only a limited
doctrine of vicarious liability for agents, 16 and in the Court of
Appeal Lord Denning sought to extend it to include liability for
whoever drove the "family car." His argument was based on social
policy, in this case the policy that victims of careless driving should
be compensated. The House of Lords rejected this extension, not
because they were unsympathetic to the policy, but because this wasthe sort of reform which could be achieved only by Parliament.
While recognising that "it is an important function of this Houseto develop and adapt the common law to meet the changing needs
of time," the House thought that it was not appropriate for the
courts to introduce "such a radical and far-reaching departure
from accepted principle." 17 Several reasons were given, but the
most significant was that the law on highway accidents is inextricably
bound up with a complicated legislative structure as to insurance,
and it would be dangerous and irresponsible "judicially to alter the
basis of liability without adequate knowledge (which we have not
the means to obtain) as to the impact this might make on the insurance system ....," 18 This was a case in which "[t]he questions of
policy need consideration by the government and Parliament, using
the resources at their command for making wide inquiries and
gathering evidence and opinions as to the practical effects of the
proposed innovations." 19
Launchbury v. Morgans is one of several recent cases in which
20
the invitation to innovate has been declined on these grounds.
The House of Lords has made little use of its own power to overrule
its previous decisions and is relatively conservative in its attitude
to judicial legislation, not because it is opposed to change, but
because it regards the judicial process as inappropriate for making
15 [1973] A.C. 127. For the Court of Appeal judgments, see [1971] 2 Q.B.
245 (C.A.).
16See Launchbury v. Morgans, [1973] A.C. 127; Hewitt v. Bonvin, [1940]
1 K.B. 188 (C.A.).
17 [1973] A.C. 127, 151 (Lord Salmon).
18 Id. 137 (Lord Wilberforce).
19 Id. 142-43 (Lord Pearson).
2
o See, most recently, Lim Poh Choo v. Camden & Islington Area Health Auth.,
[1979] 3 W.L.R. 44, 48 (H.L.) (Lord Scarman).
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changes involving major shifts in social policy. Modern law reform
is a technical business and English courts lack the machinery for
acquiring the necessary social and economic background information; there is, for instance, no English equivalent of the "Brandeis
brief." It was in recognition of these limitations on judicial reform
that the Law Commission was set up by statute to consider and
recommend law reform for implementation by Parliament. The
Law Commission has developed its own techniques of research
and consultation and has secured a great deal of statutory reform
of private law in the last decade. It is increasingly regarded as the
proper agent of major reform.
Lord Denning stands for an older, wider conception of the
judicial function. He believes that law reform is primarily a matter
for the judges, and he has never been reluctant to express his conclusions on matters of social policy. He sees no need for the judges
to wait for the Law Commission. 2 1 "They should develop the law,
case by case, as they have done in the past: so that the litigants before
them can have their differences decided by the law as it should be
and is, and not by the law of the past." 22 It is a noble vision, but
it does not correspond with the focus of the times.
Lord Denning's conclusion is that he feels that many of his
endeavours have failed. If he had time, he says, he would have told
us about three more of his innovations which have been struck down
by the House of Lords and about a fourth "not up to now condemned by higher authority." 23 The striking thing about his
examples of failure is that in two of them his views have in fact
24
largely prevailed, but by means of statute rather than case law.
The statutes are not mentioned. Perhaps he thinks that they do not
go far enough,25 but whatever the reason, Lord Denning does not
do himself justice. His judgments have on several occasions been
influential in leading to important statutory reforms.
21

"Some people seem to think that now that there is a Law Commission the
judges should leave it to them to put right any defect and to make any new development ... I decline to reduce the judges to such a sterile role." Liverpool City
Council v. Invin, [1976] 1 Q.B. 319, 332 (C.A.) (Lord Denning, M.R.).
22 Id.
23
DEmNq-,
supra note 3, at 315.
24 Unfair exemption clauses, insofar as they appear in specified types of contract, are now controlled by the Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977, c. 50. A spouse's
right to occupy the matrimonial home is protected by the Matrimonial Homes Act,
1967, c. 75, as amended by the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act, 1970,
c. 45 § 38, and the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act, 1976, c. 50.
25
See Lord Denning's comments on the Matrimonial Homes Act 1967 in
Williams & Glyn's Bank v. Bolland, [1979] 2 W.L.R. 550, 556 (C.A.).
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The most important of the omissions is Lord Denning's work
in property law. His decisions on licenses to occupy land 26 have
been socially and doctrinally important in creating an informal,
discretionary, quasi-proprietary interest which seems to transcend
the rules of real property. They also illustrate Lord Denning's
favourite argument, the appeal to equity as a solvent of traditional
classifications. The Court of Appeal cases giving wives an equitable
interest in the matrimonial home arising out of direct or indirect
contribution to its purchase 27 are also, as Lord Denning has recently
said, 28 remarkable. They have been superseded by statute in the
context of matrimonial breakdown 29 but are likely to enjoy a new
lease on life as a means of solving the property disputes of unmarried couples. 30
This, however, is only to say that one would have liked Lord
Denning to write a much bigger book. Let us hope that one day
he will because, whether one agrees with him or not, Lord Denning
is always worth reading. This reviewer, like other English law
teachers, spends much of his working life arguing with students
about his judgments. As Lord Wilberforce said in Launchbury v.
Morgans, "we may be grateful to Lord Denning M.R. for turning
our thoughts in a new direction.... ." 31
26
See, e.g., Tanner v. Tanner, [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1346 (C.A.); Binions v.
Evans, [1972] Ch. 359 (C.A.); E.R. Ives Inv. Ltd. v. High, [1967] 2 Q.B. 379
(C.A.); Inwards v. Baker, [1965] 2 Q.B. 29 (C.A.).
27See, e.g., Hazell v. Hazell, [1972] 1 W.L.R. 301 (C.A.); Hargrave v.
Newton, [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1611 (C.A.); Falconer v. Falconer, [1970] 1 W.L.R.
1333 (C.A.).
2
8 Williams & Glyn's Bank v. Bolland, [1979] 2 W.L.R. 550, 557 (C.A.).
29 Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, c. 18, §§ 24-25.
30 See Eves v. Eves, [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1338 (C.A.); Cooke v. Head, [1972]

1 W.L.R. 518 (C.A.).
31

[1973] A.C. 127, 137.

